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THE FUTURE OF FATCA: 










 Globalization and technological advancements have 
contributed to one of the more serious issues in the United 
States – offshore tax evasion.1 While it is difficult to estimate 
the exact amount of revenue losses from offshore tax schemes, 
the U.S. loses approximately $100 billion per year from 
offshore tax evasion.2 This problem was highlighted in 2009 
when Switzerland’s largest bank, UBS AG, admitted to 
defrauding the United States by impeding the Internal Revenue 
Service’s (IRS) tax revenue collection from U.S. taxpayers and 
paid $780 million in fines, interest, penalties and restitution to 
the U.S.3 As of 2016, eighty Swiss banks paid more than $1.3 
billion in penalties to the U.S. in settlements involving more 
than 34,000 accounts that held as much as $48 billion.4 
 
 The U.S. responded to the global problem of offshore 
tax evasion by enacting the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
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Act (FATCA)5  into law under section 501(a) of the Hiring 
Incentives to Restore Employments Act (HIRE), even though 
the U.S. had many successful attempts at reigning in the 
foreign banks that facilitated offshore tax evasion.6 The general 
purpose of the HIRE Act was to provide tax breaks to small 
businesses that hire unemployed workers. 7 FATCA was 
designed to authorize the IRS to collect taxes on American 
income hidden in foreign nations.8 
 
 The substantial costs associated with FATCA 
compliance has proven to be a burden for many foreign 
financial institutions.9 Instead of punishing shifty taxpayers and 
corporations, the IRS misguidedly has placed practically the 
entire burden on Americans living abroad and on the foreign 
financial institutions where Americans invest and keep their 
money. FATCA affects all U.S. citizens who own a foreign 
financial account, including banking and investment accounts, 
regardless of where they reside.10 
 
 This article will examine FATCA through presentations 
of the: (1) pertinent background that gave rise to the law; (2) 
essential elements of FATCA; and (3) analysis of the relevant 









Although U.S. taxpayers had been hiding income 
offshore for years, the IRS historically had little success 
finding such income11. The primary reason for this failure was 
that foreign financial institutions (FFIs) didn’t report any 
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information to the IRS. Occasionally, the IRS became aware of 
an offshore account,12 but the U.S. taxpayers were effectively 
on the honor system. Given what has happened since 200713, it 
would appear that many U.S. taxpayers with offshore accounts 
have not been very honorable. 
 
The loss of revenue supports the argument that offshore 
tax evasion is a crucial issue facing the U.S. Large sums of 
money are squirreled away in tax haven jurisdictions such as 
Aruba, the Cayman Islands and Dubai, whose laws allow some 
U.S. citizens to evade paying U.S. income taxes.14 Former IRS 
Commissioner Rossotti says the uncollected tax gap could be 
in the range of $250 to $300 billion per year, which is the 
equivalent of a 15 percent surtax on the honest taxpayer.15 
 
To detect tax evasion, the IRS pursued U.S. citizens 
with undeclared bank accounts in foreign banks.16 But these 
efforts were largely unsuccessful because FFIs did not fully 
report U.S. account holders’ information.17 This allowed U.S. 
citizens to avoid taxes on passive income, including interest, 





A. Detecting Tax Evasion: OVCI and QI 
 
During the period 1999 to 2003, two noteworthy events 
occurred. First, the IRS started to pursue offshore accounts 
when it (1) obtained credit card data from John Doe 
summons, 19 and (2) offered its first offshore voluntary 
compliance initiative (OVCI) in 2003.20 The OVCI resulted in 
around 1,300 individuals identifying themselves to the IRS 
with approximately $75 million collected through July 2003.21 
The knowledge obtained by the IRS from pursuing various 
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John Doe summons and structuring the OVCI greatly aided the 
IRS when it pursued offshore accounts in Switzerland starting 
in 2008.22 
 
The second event occurred on January 1, 2001, which 
was the date the U.S. implemented the Qualified Intermediary 
(QI) system.23 Prior to 2001, FFIs did not: (1) collect U.S. tax 
documentation with respect to any taxpayers; (2) withhold U.S. 
tax, (3) file information returns with the IRS; or (4) submit to 
IRS examinations. As a result: (1) a U.S. taxpayer could invest 
in U.S. source assets with an FFI but the FFI was not required 
to report anything to the IRS;24 and (2) U.S. banks were not 
obtaining adequate documentation from FFIs to document a 
reduced U.S. withholding tax rate on payments to foreign 
customers of such FFIs.25 
 
By implementing the QI system, the IRS was 
attempting to address these two problems. As a result, the QI 
system required QIs to identify their customers. If they were 
foreign customers, the QI could keep the identity of the 
customer secret as long as the correct amount of U.S. 
withholding tax was collected. For U.S. customers, the QI was 
required to report to the IRS any U.S. source income. To keep 
the QIs honest, the QI system required an audit by either the 
IRS or an independent auditor.26 
 
While the QI system was a major advancement when 
compared to the pre-2001 tax evasion environment, it became 
apparent that it wasn’t working well at preventing U.S. 
taxpayers from using offshore accounts to avoid U.S. taxes. 
There were several major loopholes that U.S. taxpayers 
exploited in order to avoid reporting income to the IRS.27  
 
The loopholes of the QI system were: (1) that foreign 
source income was not required to be reported; (2) there was 
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no requirement to determine the beneficial owner; (3) that FFIs 
were allowed to exclude certain customers from the QI system; 
and (4) the QI audit was not really an audit but rather a list of 
procedures that needed to be performed. 28  These loopholes 
were on the minds of the IRS, the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. 
Congressional staff when they proposed and drafted FATCA in 




B. The Liechtenstein Global Trust  
and Union Bank of Switzerland 
 Tax Evasion Scandals 
 
In February 2008, it was publicly disclosed that 
German tax authorities had purchased customer account 
information from an employee at the Liechtenstein bank of 
LGT. This bank had close ties to the Liechtenstein royal 
family. Apparently, the German tax authorities had shared the 
information with nations around the world and the IRS initiated 
an enforcement action against over 100 U.S. taxpayers with 
offshore accounts at LGT.30 
 
In May 2008, an even bigger scandal erupted when the 
U.S. arrested Bradley Birkenfeld, a former UBS banker who 
pleaded guilty one month later to assisting U.S. taxpayers 
evade U.S. tax by using offshore accounts. Birkenfeld’s guilty 
plea included all types of spy-like techniques used by 
Birkenfeld and his colleagues to avoid U.S. detection. These 
spy-like techniques included encrypted computers, code words, 
smuggling diamonds in toothpaste tubes and more.31 
 
Reports indicate that Bradley Birkenfeld came forward 
under the IRS’s whistleblower program in 2007 and had been 
disclosing information to the IRS for several months. However, 
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he failed to disclose to the IRS and the Justice Department 
information concerning his largest account, Igor Olenicoff. As 
a result, despite blowing the whistle on UBS, Birkenfeld was 
prosecuted and received a sentence of forty months.32 
On June 30, 2008, the IRS filed a John Doe summons 
with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida, requesting that UBS disclose to the IRS all of its U.S. 
customers that may have been avoiding the payment of U.S. 
tax. One day later, UBS refused to comply with the summons 
arguing that under Swiss bank secrecy law, they were not 
permitted to disclose customer information.33 
 
In July 2008, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations (PSI) held publicized hearings on offshore 
accounts. At these hearings, IRS Commissioner Shulman gave 
testimony surrounding offshore accounts and the QI system: 
“Specifically, we are considering changes to the regulations to 
require QIs to look through certain foreign entities – such as 
trusts – to determine whether any U.S. taxpayers are beneficial 
owners. We are also considering a regulation to have QIs 
report U.S. taxpayers’ worldwide income to the IRS in certain 
cases – not just U.S. source income.”34 
 
The PSI report found that LGT and UBS assisted U.S. 
clients in structuring their foreign accounts to avoid QI 
reporting to the IRS. The report also found that the IRS should 
broaden QI audits to require bank auditors to report evidence of 
fraud or illegality.35 Since the QI system was created through 
Treasury regulations and FFI contracts, the IRS and the 
Treasury could have changed the QI rules without legislation. 
However, since there was a strong desire to impose 
withholding taxes on financial institutions that were not part of 
the QI, legislation was needed.36 This is how FATCA would be 
conceived. 
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In August 2009, the IRS and UBS ultimately settled the 
John Doe summons instead of allowing the Court to decide the 
conflicts of law issue between U.S. and Swiss law. UBS agreed 
to disclose information on approximately 4,450 U.S. 
customers.37 But given the loopholes and issues surrounding 
the QI system, there was general agreement among senior IRS 






III.  FATCA EPITOMIZED 
 
 
 In 2010, FATCA amended the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 by adding a new Chapter 4. 39  In order to enforce 
FACTA more easily, the U.S. entered into several 
intergovernmental agreements (IGA), whereby foreign 
governments agreed to collect the required information from 
financial institutions located in their nations and disclose that 
information to the IRS on an annual basis.40 While FATCA has 
several focuses, the most pertinent facet of the law concern 




A. The FATCA Regulation of FFIs 
 
An alarming aspect of FATCA for FFIs is the severe 
penalty associated with a violation. Any FFI that fails to meet 
the FATCA reporting requirements will be subject to a 
stringent 30% withholding tax on all payments of U.S. source 
income.42 To avoid this penalty, an FFI must fall into one of 
two categories: (1) it has an agreement with the U.S. Treasury 
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Secretary; or (2) it meets certain criteria ensuring that it does 
not maintain financial accounts owned by one or more U.S. 
persons or U.S.-owned foreign entities.43 
 
As discussed earlier, one of the major problems with the QI 
system was the ability of the QI to ignore customer accounts. 
One of the major FATCA design features was to require that a 
QI have procedures to identify all U.S. customers within the QI 
and potentially identify all U.S. customers in affiliated FFIs.44 
 
 For example, assume that a hypothetical foreign bank 
has 2 million customers throughout the world, but only 1% of 
such customers are U.S. persons and 2% of the foreign bank’s 
customers have investments in the U.S. In this hypothetical 
example, FATCA requires the foreign bank to perform detailed 
customer due diligence procedures on its entire 2 million 
customer base in order to properly identify the 3% that could 
be directly impacted by FATCA. If the foreign bank did not 
perform this customer due diligence effectively, it could be 
subject to the penalty of 30% withholding tax on all payments 
of U.S. source income. 
 
This leads to the next problem regarding the payment of the 
penalty. How would one determine whether a payment to an 
FFI is attributable to a withholdable payment? The 
IRS/Treasury has tentatively decided to apply a pro-rata 
approach.45 So, if 20% of a FFI’s worldwide assets are U.S. 
assets, then 20% of the non-U.S. source payments to an FFI or 
a recalcitrant account holder would be subject to the 30% 
withholding tax penalty. Needless to say, this would lead to a 
lot of administrative complexity, especially in cases where 
local laws may restrict the collection of withholding tax on 
payments that appear to be unrelated to the U.S. 
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As an alternative, the FFI may elect “to be withheld upon 
rather than withhold on payments to recalcitrant account 
holders and nonparticipating FFIs” If an FFI elects this 
alternative, the IRS will only withhold 30% of all withholdable 
payments to the FFI that are directly attributable to the 
recalcitrant account holder and nonparticipating FFI. 46 
However, an FFI that elects this option will forfeit any rights it 
may have under any treaty with the U.S. with respect to any 
amount withheld as a result of such election – leading to a loss 
of significant earnings for the FFI even after the FFI has 
provided all of the lengthy, required information about the 
account holder. 
 
FATCA also has some loopholes. A FFI does not have to 
report any depository accounts it maintains belonging to U.S. 
beneficiaries when the aggregate value of all accounts the FFI 
maintains is less than $50,000.47 Nor does a FFI have to report 
any account held by another FFI that is in compliance with the 
FATCA reporting requirements. 48 Furthermore, the U.S. 
Treasury has chosen not to withhold the 30% penalty from 
FFIs if the beneficial owner is: (1) part of a foreign 
government; (2) part of an international agency; (3) a foreign 
central bank; or (4) anyone else whom the U.S. Treasury 
believes poses a low risk of tax evasion.49 It is possible that 
some FFIs may use these loopholes to circumvent FATCA 




B. Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) 
 
FATCA requires that FFIs enter into agreements with the 
IRS that require the “participating” FFI to perform 
identification and due diligence procedures concerning account 
holders. 50  A different level of diligence is expected with 
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respect to individual accounts and entity accounts as well as 
between new and preexisting accounts.51 FFIs that comply with 
the due diligence guidelines will be deemed to be compliant 
with the identifying requirement and not held to the strict 
liability standard.52 
 
When the proposed regulations were released, the U.S. 
Treasury also released a joint statement with the British, 
French, German, Italian and Spanish governments regarding an 
intergovernmental approach that would allow the financial 
institutions of these nations to report the required FATCA 
information to their own governments. These respective 
governments would then report the data to the IRS. 53  The 
intergovernmental approach framework would include the 
elimination of the requirement of the FFI to negotiate a 
separate agreement with the IRS. The U.S. Treasury stressed 
that these IGAs are an alternative approach to obtaining the 
information required by FATCA, not an exception. 54  The 
European Commissioner of Taxation stated that the goal is to 
develop a Model Agreement that could be used by all of the 
Member Nations and ultimately lead to automatic information 
exchange between countries.55 
 
 The U.S. Treasury is engaged in active negotiations 
with a number of nations and jurisdictions so it is conceivable 
that FATCA will become the global standard.56 More than 80 
nations have signed on to the U.S. law.57 One ramification of 
these IGAs is that in order for them to be productive, the U.S. 
will must also provide these nations with information on 
accounts held in U.S. financial institutions by the residents of 
these nations. On behalf of the U.S. Treasury, Assistant 
Secretary McMahon stated that “……bilateral solutions require 
reciprocity.” 58  It is natural to speculate that such an 
undertaking may lead to information leaks. 
 
2018 / The Future of FATCA / 62 
 
 
 The exchange process under FATCA is constantly 
changing and many are worried about the implications of this 
everchanging process.59  There are many increased risks and 






IV. FATCA ISSUES 
 
 
 The FATCA withholding tactics will only bring an 
estimated $1 billion of lost taxes back to the U.S.60 While $1 
billion may sound like a substantial amount, it pales in 
comparison to the estimated $99 billion of American taxes that 
will remain lost every year as well as the extremely high cost 
of FATCA compliance to FFIs. 61  The estimated cost of 
FATCA implementation is $100 million per financial 
institution.62 
 
Industry experts estimate that about 900,000 FFIs are 
subject to FATCA, which means that the total cost of FATCA 
implementation of $90 billion will dramatically overcome its 
potential tax savings of $1 billion.63 With an estimated success 
rate of 1% and the hefty costs placed on FFIs, many Americans 
may have their foreign bank accounts closed as a result of 
FATCA.64 
 
FATCA has been met with accusations ranging from claims 
of unfair treatment, to human rights abuse, to constitutional 




63 / Vol 37 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
 
A. Unfair Treatment 
 
 The nonprofit, nonpartisan, volunteer association with a 
caucus in Congress, American Citizens Abroad, stated in a 
letter to the Congressional Ways and Means Committee that it 
has “received multiple testimonies of Americans residing 
overseas who have had bank accounts in their country of 
residence closed, who have been denied entry into foreign 
pension plans and insurance contracts, who have had 
mortgages cancelled, who have been pushed off joint-bank 
accounts held with foreign spouses.”66 
 
 Furthermore, American Citizens Abroad claims that 
Americans living abroad cannot easily withdraw their money 
from the closed foreign account and redeposit it with U.S. 
financial institutions because the Patriot Act discourages U.S. 
financial institutions from taking on clients living overseas.67 
So “the average American living abroad is shut off from all 
avenues for personal investment.”68 
 
 In addition to being closed out from financial 
institutions, Americans living abroad may find it more difficult 
to become owners in new overseas business ventures due to 
FATCA’s requirement that such ventures be reported to the 




B. Human Rights Abuse 
 
 In order to implement FATCA, Americans living 
abroad must be singled out on the basis of their national 
origin. 70  American Citizens Abroad believes FATCA forces 
FFIs and foreign governments to discriminate against 
Americans.71 




 While New Zealand is known for upholding human 
rights, its government officials have acknowledged their 
intention to displace human rights in order to comply with 
FATCA. 72  In a letter published by New Zealand’s tax 
authority, Internal Revenue, the New Zealand government 
determined that violating the rights of U.S. persons was 
necessary, given the risk under FATCA of either being shut out 
of the U.S. investment market or facing the 30% withholding 
penalty associated with noncompliance.73 
 If FATCA does discriminate against Americans, it 
would be a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), 74  which as adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1948.75 The UDHR clearly states that no 
person shall be discriminated against on the basis of national 
origin and no distinction is made because of the nation a person 
comes from.76 
 
 A number of legal cases involving FATCA have 
already surfaced. In 2014, the Dutch Board for the Protection 
of Human Rights ruled against FATCA on the basis of 
nationality discrimination. 77  Also in 2014, several Canadian 
citizens filed a lawsuit against the Canadian Attorney General 
in Federal Court in Canada.78 The Canadian plaintiffs hope to 
prevent the Canadian government from turning over private 
bank account information under FATCA from more than one 
million United States persons and their families who live in 
Canada.79 In 2016, Rand Paul and several other plaintiffs filed 
a suit against the U.S. Treasury and other government agencies 
over foreign bank account reporting requirements under the 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act; however, an Ohio 
District Court judge dismissed this suit for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), without 
prejudice.80 
 





C. Constitutionality of IGAs 
 
 The U.S. Treasury began implementing IGAs with 
foreign nations when dealing with the difficulty of 
implementing FATCA overseas.81 Since the U.S. Treasury is 
an administrative agency under the Executive branch, these 
IGAs are considered executive agreements. 82  Executive 
agreements are limited in scope; “according to the Restatement 
of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S., the President may 
validly conclude executive agreements that (1) cover matters 
that are solely within his executive power, or (2) are made 
pursuant to a treaty, or (3) are made pursuant to a legitimate act 
of Congress.”83 
 
 IGAs were never mentioned as a proviso of the HIRE 
Act, so technically, the President has no power to form IGAs 
through the use of executive agreements; this means that the 
IGAs must go through the Senate treaty making process to 
legitimately bind the U.S.84 But since the FACTA IGAs were 
never brought to the Senate, there is no statutory authorization 
under which the IRS may enter into them and they are not 
treaty-based amendments.85 This indicates that the IGAs have 
no congressional authorization, which in turn means that they 
must be sole executive agreements. 86  If the IGAs are sole 
executive agreements, then they are not binding because the 
Executive branch does not have the power to enter into such 
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D. Privacy and Security Leaks 
 
 FATCA has caused Americans living abroad to be even 
more afraid of security risks when their personal financial 
information is reported by non-U.S. financial institutions or 
foreign government agencies to the IRS.88 FATCA reporting 
will include: (1) the name, address and taxpayer identification 
number of each US account holder at the financial institution; 
(2) the account number; (3) account balance and value; (4) the 
account’s gross receipts and gross withdrawals or payments; 
and (5) other account related information requested by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 89  The Treasury Inspector 
General for Tax Administration has voiced concerns with the 
security of data transmission as required by FATCA.90   
 
 In September 2014, the IRS issued a fraud alert to all 
international financial institutions that are complying with 
FATCA. Scam artists posing as the IRS have fraudulently 
solicited financial institutions seeking the identities of account 
holders as well as their financial account information. 91  
Financial institutions registered to comply with FATCA, and 
those in jurisdictions that have an IGA in effect to implement 
the FATCA provisions through their local governments, have 
already been approached by parties impersonating themselves 
as the IRS. The IRS now has reports of incidents from various 
countries and continents.92 
 
 The issues of unfair treatment, human rights abuse, 
unconstitutionality and security are all reasons supporting the 
repeal of FATCA, especially since the costs of implementing 











 While tax evasion is an enormous problem, FATCA is 
not a solution to the problem. FATCA was primarily created to 
deal with the weaknesses of the QI system but it has turned out 
to be a case of overregulation that infringes upon the rights of 
Americans who live abroad. A strengthening of the QI system 
may have been enough to adequately address the issue of 
global tax evasion without the need to create a costly, massive 
piece of legislation that infringes on the rights of so many and 
may prove to be a threat to security. 
 
 Given the facts that (1) many Americans living abroad 
have been denied access into their foreign pensions, insurance 
contracts and bank accounts as a result of FATCA; (2) many 
Americans may be singled out on the basis of their national 
origin because of FACTA; (3) the constitutionality of FACTA 
may be questionable; and (4) scam artists have already 
obtained personal information about people as a result of the 
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